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Some years back there appeared a book entitled Constitutional Stu-
pidities, Constitutional Tragedies, in which esteemed constitutional theo-
rists were asked to identify what they regarded as the worst mistake in
the United States Constitution.' The contributors, most of whom gener-
ally revered the Constitution, identified failings ranging from the Electo-
ral College to the exclusion of naturalized citizens from presidential
eligibility to an apparent oversight that allows the Vice President to pre-
side over his own impeachment trial. 2
In a thought-provoking article in this Journal, Seth Barrett Tillman
presents the surprising argument that the Constitution's script for law-
making does not require that the House and Senate both pass a particular
bill during the term of the same two-year Congress. 3 Rather, as his arti-
cle's subtitle indicates, the Senate of the 110th Congress could enact a
bill passed by the House during the 109th Congress, even over the oppo-
sition of the 110th House. Tillman recognizes that this argument-which
he presents through the mouth of a puckish imaginary congressional ad-
visor-runs contrary to tradition and the conventional wisdom. If Till-
man's argument were right, many people would regard this as a troubling
feature of the Constitution, quite possibly a fault befitting a place in a
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. I thank Eric Berger,
David Dow, Michael Olivas, and Jordan Paust for helpful comments and discussions on differ-
ent aspects of this paper. I thank the editors of this Journal for inviting me to publish this
response.
1 CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES (William N. Eskridge, Jr.
& Sanford Levinson eds., 1998).
2 Akhil Reed Amar, A Constitutional Accident Waiting to Happen, in CONSTITUTONAL
STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES, supra note 1, at 15-17 (Electoral College); Randall
Kennedy, A Natural Aristocracy?, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGE-
DIES, supra note 1, at 54-56 (exclusion of naturalized citizens); Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Someone Should Have Told Spiro Agnew, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL
TRAGEDIES, supra note 1, at 75-76 (impeachment of the Vice President). The portions of the
original Constitution protecting slavery were ruled ineligible for the competition. William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson, Introduction, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITU-
TIONAL TRAGEDIES, supra note 1, at 2.
3 Seth Barrett Tillman, Noncontemporaneous Lawmaking: Can the 110th Senate Enact
a Bill Passed by the 109th House?, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 331 (2007).
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future volume dedicated to constitutional blunders. But does the mistake
(if that it be) lie not with the Constitution but instead with Tillman's
argument? Is Tillman right, or should the Constitution be read to avoid
his result, thus averting a potential constitutional tragedy?
In this short response, I will play the role of the sober straight man
to Tillman's mischief-maker. The "contemporaneity" requirement is one
of those rules that "everyone knows" (or at least thinks they know) but
that is seldom defended. I will set out, in brief and somewhat tentative
form, what I find to be the strongest counter-arguments to Tillman's po-
sition. Although he is correct that the constitutional text is coy (at best)
regarding the need for contemporaneity, structural, practical, and histori-
cal factors support some type of contemporaneity requirement.
I. DOES THE CONSTITUTION CONTEMPLATE
CONTEMPORANEITY?
There may be plausible political theories that would see the possi-
bility of noncontemporaneous legislative activity as a virtue. So what is
wrong with noncontemporaneity, from the point of view of our Constitu-
tion? I will begin with a sketch at the level of general principles.
The Constitution is democratic in that sovereignty ultimately rests
in the people, but it is not crudely majoritarian in a plebiscitary fashion.
To become a law, a bill must win approval from both the House of Rep-
resentatives and the Senate, and it is then subject to veto by the executive
(unless there is a supermajority in both chambers). Each of these bodies
represents the people differently: population-based representation in the
House, equality among states in the Senate, 4 and a nationwide constitu-
ency for the executive. Officeholders in each body serve terms of differ-
ent lengths, corresponding to varying degrees of accountability to public
opinion. What this means is that legislation requires multiple majorities
of different kinds.
To be sure, this legislative arrangement is in no small part simply
the result of wrangling and compromise between large states and small
states, as well as between delegates with different ideas of how demo-
cratic the new government should be. But the institutional arrangement
they ultimately chose does embody and reflect certain political values.
For an explication and defense of that sometimes implicit political the-
ory, it is customary to turn to The Federalist.5 As No. 62 explains, the
4 In the original Constitution, Senators were elected by state legislatures. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 3, cl. 1. Today that is no longer true, see id. amend. XVII, but the Senate still over-
represents the interests of small states. See generally Lynn A. Baker & Samuel H. Dinkin, The
Senate: An Institution Whose Time Has Gone?, 13 J.L. & POL. 21 (1997).
5 Tillman has previously argued that commentators err in treating The Federalist as
infallible in its treatment of many details, but he apparently still grants that it is a reliable guide
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Constitution, and bicameralism in particular, creates a "complicated
check on legislation."'6 An obvious cost of this check is that problems (as
perceived by some of the majorities needed to pass legislation) can go
unaddressed. But the benefits-touted in several of the essays in The
Federalist-are conventionally regarded as greater: more protection for
minority interests, more deliberative and measured lawmaking, a double
barrier against corruption and faction, and so forth.7
Noncontemporaneous lawmaking embodies a rather different and
more promiscuous approach to lawmaking: as long as a bill wins the
support of one chamber at time tt and the other chamber and the Presi-
dent at time t2, it may become law whether or not the first chamber still
supports it.8 A law may result even though there is no time at which the
people and the states both agree to it. Although Tillman's example con-
cerns two adjacent Congresses, the two dates might in principle be de-
cades apart. Tillman's hypothetical advisor lauds the proposal for
"expanding democracy by easing.., constraints" on the lawmaking pro-
cess,9 but that justification is problematic on at least two counts. First, as
already suggested, one animating principle of our republican Constitu-
tion is constraint on lawmaking. Second, Tillman's proposal actually
seems to contradict fundamental democratic principles inasmuch as it
contemplates an equal role in lawmaking for legislators whose terms
have expired-not just the familiar lame ducks, but dead-and-gone
ducks. 10
to understanding basic theoretical questions about the structure of the Constitution. See Seth
Barrett Tillman, The Federalist Papers as Reliable Historical Source Material for Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 105 W. VA. L. REv. 601, 617 (2003).
6 THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 378 (probably James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
7 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), No. 62 (probably James
Madison), No. 64 (John Jay), No. 73 (Alexander Hamilton).
8 Indeed, it seems that the President need not approve at time t 2 either. If the President at
t2 would veto the bill, the t2 Senate (assuming it is the second house to act) could instruct a
clerk to squirrel away the authenticated enrolled bill until some time t3 when a favorably
inclined President were in office, at which point the agent would present it for signature. After
all, the text of the Constitution does not expressly state when presentment is to occur and, as
Tillman points out, Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark suggests that the courts will not look behind
a signed enrolled bill to see if it has been properly passed by Congress. See 143 U.S. 649,
671-73 (1892). Under Tillman's view, it appears that there is no objection in principle to such
a bill becoming law at t3, even if the t 3 Senate does not continue to affirmatively support it.
9 Tillman, supra note 3, at 336.
10 The lame-duck problem results from the lag between when elections are held and
when newly elected legislators replace the previous legislators. This problem partly motivated
the Twentieth Amendment, which shortened the lag time and which many people expected
would eliminate lame-duck sessions of Congress. See John Copeland Nagle, A Twentieth
Amendment Parable, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 470, 477-89 (1997). The problem here goes well
beyond lame-duckism because the term of the 109th Congress is completely over when the bill
one of its houses passed is enacted by the other house during the 110th Congress.
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Tillman recognizes that many readers will find noncontemporaneity
intuitively jarring for reasons such as those above, and he therefore iden-
tifies three cases in which the Constitution is said to embrace noncon-
temporaneity already: the sometimes lengthy process of ratifying
constitutional amendments, presidential power to act on bills after the
end of a Congress, and the treaty-formation process. I consider each in
turn.
The Article V Amendment Process. Tillman is correct that anyone
arguing for a constitutional principle of contemporaneity has to grapple
with the troublesome Twenty-Seventh Amendment. That amendment,
which governs congressional pay raises,"I was proposed by Congress in
1789 but did not win ratification from the requisite number of states until
1992-a lapse of over 200 years. Assuming that the majority view on
this matter is correct and that the Twenty-Seventh Amendment is valid,12
how can one reconcile that result with a contemporaneity requirement in
Article I?
Article V contains no explicit time limit, nor does there appear to be
any principled way of picking a date to count as an implied "reasonable"
time. All the same, a sensible and powerful argument for a time limit
would begin with the premise that the amendment process should be a
serious undertaking requiring supermajority, indeed consensus, support.
If the process could be stretched out indefinitely, then there might be no
point at which even two states and their citizens support an amendment.
With enough time (200 years, 1000 years, when will the Constitution
end?), one could imagine a horrid amendment 13 winning ratification by
catching fire in one momentarily deranged state while every other state
11 U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII ("No law, varying the compensation for the services of
the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall
have intervened.").
12 Notable commentators from across the political spectrum have deemed the amend-
ment valid. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitu-
tional Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677 (1993); Laurence H.
Tribe, The 27th Amendment Joins the Constitution, WALL ST. J., May 13, 1992, at A15. Al-
though it is not clear that it had any proper role in judging ratification, the 1992 Congress
overwhelmingly voted to recognize the new amendment. Richard L. Berke, Congress Backs
27th Amendment, N.Y. TimEs, May 21, 1992, at A26. For dissenting views on the amend-
ment's validity, see Stewart Dalzell & Eric J. Beste, Is the Twenty-Seventh Amendment 200
Years Too Late?, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 501 (1994); John R. Vile, Just Say No to "Stealth"
Amendment, NAT'L L.J., June 22, 1992, at 15; cf Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 375 (1921)
(noting in dicta that "ratification must be within some reasonable time after the proposal").
Note that we are here concerned with a case in which Congress did not set any deadline when
proposing the amendment. Congress has for some time been in the habit of establishing dead-
lines, particularly a seven-year deadline, either in the text of the amendment itself or in the
accompanying resolution. See Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change:
Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97 HARV. L. REV. 386, 406-09 (1983).
13 For example, one of the amendments that was sent to the states but which has not
(yet!?) been ratified is a pre-Civil War amendment that would have entrenched slavery against
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opposes it, then decades later winning approval in another state while all
the rest (including the citizens of the former ratifier) oppose it, and so
forth. Indeed, this line of reasoning supports what is probably the strong-
est argument put forth in Dillon v. Gloss, in which the Supreme Court
stated in dicta that ratification must be concluded within a "reasonable"
time:
As ratification is but the expression of the approbation of
the people and is to be effective when had in three-
fourths of the states, there is a fair implication that it
must be sufficiently contemporaneous in that number of
states to reflect the will of the people in all sections at
relatively the same period, which of course ratification
scattered through a long series of years would not do.' 4
Contemporaneity of consent is thus the way to ensure that there is truly a
consensus.
Fortunately, we can honor the need for consensus in the amendment
process without inserting an arbitrary time limit. The way to do so is to
recognize that a state, once it agrees to an amendment, continues to give
assent (though silently) until it tells us otherwise. A state is in this regard
like a person. A person is not remade anew every day. I change over
time, but I remain the same person. I have the authority to give a tempo-
rally open-ended consent: "From now until I tell you otherwise, you may
do X." The question regarding X need not be put to me afresh every day
(or every moment) to see if I still consent. Likewise, when Ohio says yes
to the Twenty-Seventh Amendment in 1873 and Michigan says yes in
1992, those states' consent is contemporaneous because Ohio's consent
endures. Ohio is still Ohio, and we need not ask it again. At the same
time, states (again, like people) can change their minds and withdraw
consent; Ohio can rescind its ratification if it later changes its mind (but
only up until the time the requisite number of states have consented, for
at that point that deal has been sealed and Ohio, like a person, is bound
by its word). Thus, the way to give Article V a faithful reading yet also
to ensure the contemporaneous consensus that any sensible process re-
quires is not to impose an arbitrary implied time limit on ratification but
to combine indefinite ratification periods with the ability to rescind
before ultimate ratification of the amendment.1 5 So understood, the
Twenty-Seventh Amendment does not support noncontemporaneity.
future abolition. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 113-14 &
n.457 (2006).
14 256 U.S. at 375.
15 I certainly do not claim to be the first to read Article V this way. See, e.g., AMAR,
supra note 13, at 455-56; Brandon Troy Ishikawa, Everything You Always Wanted To Know
About How Amendments Are Made But Were Afraid To Ask, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 545,
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Delayed Presidential Signatures. Tillman cites examples in which
Presidents have signed bills within the constitutionally prescribed ten
days after the bill was presented to them but in which the signature oc-
curred at the beginning of the Congress following the Congress that
passed the bill. For example, Congress passes a bill on March 3, presents
it to the President, and then finally adjourns that same day; the newly
elected Congress begins meeting on March 4, and the President signs the
bill on March 8, during the new Congress. Further, in some instances,
legislators have delayed the presentment of a bill passed at the end of one
Congress until the beginning of the next Congress.' 6 Thus there is some
history of noncontemporaneity as regards the presidential ingredient in
lawmaking. Assuming that this practice is permissible, 17 it does not nec-
essarily follow that noncontemporaneity as to bicameral passage is per-
missible. There are two reasons.
First, because the Constitution does not actually require presidential
approval for lawmaking, 18 it is hard to see how the Constitution could
require presidential approval at some particular time in relation to con-
gressional passage. In other words, the Constitution can leave some wig-
gle room for unconventional practices surrounding the timing of the
President's role in lawmaking without affecting any requirements regard-
ing bicameralism.
550 (1997); Paulsen, supra note 12, at 724-33. I should note that the position in the text does
not necessarily require that Congress be permitted to withdraw an amendment proposal once it
is sent to the states; the states' ability to rescind their consent is sufficient to ensure popular
consensus. I note as well that rescission may be more complicated in the event that Congress
specifies that ratification is to be accomplished by state conventions rather than by state legis-
latures. Cf. Seth Barrett Tillman, Reply, Defending the (Not So) Indefensible, 16 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL'y 370-71 n.26 (2007). But, in my view, the fact that a particular convention may
disperse after having ratified an amendment does not necessarily mean that a state convention
could not later rescind ratification.
16 See Tillman, supra note 3, at 340-42.
17 Although Tillman is correct that the prevailing view now allows the practice, see JOHN
V. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE HousE OF REPRE-
SENTATIVES, H.R. Doc. No. 108-24 1, § 111, at 56 (2005) (hereinafter MANUAL), there is some
earlier authority that took a contrary view. See IV ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS' PRECEDENTS OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES § 3497, at 345 (1907); see also Ed-
wards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482, 487-90 (1932) (discussing conflicting views on the
matter but deeming a statute signed after final adjournment valid). Tillman believes that the
logic of Edwards, which concerned delayed presidential action but not bicameral noncon-
temporaneity, dictates that the two houses need not act during the same two-year term either.
See Tillman, supra note 15, at 369-70. Needless to say, my position in the text reflects my
disagreement: I believe that the case of a bill passed by only one house is sufficiently different
from the case of a bill duly passed by both houses such that the Edwards result does not
control.
18 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 ("If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within
ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a
Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent
its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law." (emphasis added)); id. (providing for veto
overrides).
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Second, other considerations tend to show that there is still contem-
poraneity of consent between Congress and the President in the above
circumstances, despite the beginning of a new Congress. In cases in
which presentment has been delayed until the next Congress, somebody
has to present the bill to the President, and the agents who do this are
accountable to the current Congress, not the previous one that actually
passed the bill. At one time, presentment was made by a joint committee
of the House and Senate; 19 presumably, those committee members would
not present an old bill of which one or both houses disapproved. Under
more modem practice, presentment is made by agents of the originating
house,20 and so presentment carries with it the imprimatur of continuing
support from the house that first began the lawmaking process. Further,
regardless of when presentment occurs, there is a practice of the houses
asking the President to return enrolled bills (such as to amend or correct
them), to which requests the President has customarily acceded. 21
The factors discussed above tend (at least) to diminish any worries
regarding noncontemporaneity between bicameral passage and presiden-
tial approval. To be sure, it may well be that none of the ameliorative
practices just mentioned are constitutionally required. Nonetheless, the
point here is that if one wishes to make an argument in favor of bicam-
eral noncontemporaneity on the basis of some history of delayed presi-
dential approval, then one should consider the entirety of the past
practice, including those features that tend to ensure that there remains a
contemporaneity of actual consent.
The Treaty Process. Similar comments apply in the case of treaties,
even assuming that the treaty process is relevant notwithstanding its lack
of any requirement of bicameralism. True, there is some history of Presi-
dents ratifying a treaty during a Congress following the one during which
the Senate gave its advice and consent to the treaty.22 And it is also
certainly true that a treaty may remain in the Senate awaiting advice and
consent for many years after the President submits it.23 The possibility of
a lengthy treaty process might well be a cause for concern if the relevant
institutions generally disfavored the treaty but temporarily supported it at
different times. (In the extreme case of noncontemporaneity, an execu-
19 MANUAL, supra note 17, § 577, at 301-02.
20 Id.; CHARLES W. JOHNSON, How OUR LAWS ARE MADE, H.R. Doc. No. 108-93, at 51
(2003).
21 See, e.g., MANUAL, supra note 17, § 110, at 55; IV HINDS' PRECEDENTS §§ 3507-18;
VII CANNON'S PRECEDENTS § 1091 (all discussing congressional requests that the President
return an enrolled bill).
22 Tillman, supra note 3, at 340 n.19 (citing example from 1968-70).
23 CONG. RES. SERV., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF
THE U.S. SENATE, S. PRINT 106-71, at 143-45 (Comm. Print 2001) (hereinafter THE ROLE OF
THE SENATE).
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tive might sign an unpopular treaty and submit it to the Senate for advice
and consent at time t, the treaty would sit in the Senate attracting only
scorn until an idiosyncratic Senate finally approves at t + 50 years, and
then the treaty sits unratified by sensible Presidents until t + 100 years, at
which point the original President's peculiar great-grandson ratifies.)
Once again, however, when one considers the whole picture there
are a number of steps that the relevant actors can take, if they wish, in
order to prevent temporally extended mix-and-match approval of a
treaty. The President evidently can withdraw the country from a signed
but unratified treaty that he opposes or that is languishing in the Senate,
as President Bush did with the treaty establishing the International Crimi-
nal Court, which President Clinton had signed. 24 The President has in
some cases asked the Senate to return treaties to him before advice and
consent has been given, and the Senate has honored those requests.2 5 The
Senate could vote to send a disfavored treaty back to the President so that
it does not remain on the calendar awaiting approval indefinitely. 26 The
Senate has apparently not attempted to withdraw previously given con-
sent from a yet-to-be ratified treaty, and it is unclear if it could do so;27
nonetheless, at least one President has thought it proper (though not nec-
essarily constitutionally required) to ask for advice and consent again
when the Senate had previously given its advice and consent but there
24 See Peter Slevin, U.S. Renounces Its Support of New Tribunal for War Crimes, WASH.
POST, May 7, 2002, at Al. Article 18 of the Vienna Convention, which the United States has
not ratified but which has generally been regarded as restating customary international law,
provides that a signatory that has not yet ratified a treaty has an interim obligation not to
frustrate the purpose of that treaty unless and until it notifies other parties of its intention not to
ratify. See Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 312 cmt. i (1987).
See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S. Constitu-
tion, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. _ (forthcoming 2007) (discussing effect of signed but unratified
treaties). If there is an interim obligation pending ratification, the ability to repudiate the initial
signature when ratification is unlikely makes much sense.
25 FLOYD M. RIDDICK & ALAN S. FRUMIN, RIDDICK'S SENATE PROCEDURE 1307 (1992);
Michael J. Glennon, The Senate Role in Treaty Ratification, 77 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 257, 277
n. 119 (1983). Admittedly, the Senate's compliance is perhaps a matter of comity rather than of
presidential right. But cf David C. Scott, Comment, Presidential Power to "Un-Sign " Trea-
ties, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1447, 1457-74 (2002) (arguing that the President can unilaterally
withdraw a treaty from the Senate). The President's other tools for killing a treaty (such as the
"unsigning" power mentioned above) mean that the Senate will usually not have much to gain
from picking a fight.
26 THE ROLE OF THE SENATE, supra note 23, at 12, 145.
27 Id. at 143. The case against the Senate's ability to rescind is evidently based on the
idea that it lacks power to act with regard to a treaty that has left its physical custody. See id.
There would rarely be occasion for the Senate to attempt to rescind its consent because: (1)
ratification usually follows very soon after advice and consent, and (2) the Senate generally
would not consent to a treaty that it does not contemplate the President ratifying. But see
SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES: THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 101 (2d ed. 1916) (opin-
ing that the Senate can rescind advice and consent at any time before ratification).
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had been a long lapse without ratification. 2 8 Thus, treaty practice taken
as a whole tends to be characterized by noncontemporaneous formal ac-
tion but not by noncontemporaneity of consent. Indeed, the leading ex-
ample of delayed ratification, which Tillman cites,29 does not reflect
noncontemporaneity of consent; advice and consent was given in the
90th Congress but presidential ratification was delayed until the 91st
Congress due to the lack of implementing legislation, which the 91st
Congress supplied.30 Things might have gone differently had the Senate
of the 91st Congress opposed the treaty that its predecessor supported.
Here I should add some words by way of clarification and qualifica-
tion. One version of contemporaneity would hold that a bill must be
passed by both houses within the term of a single Congress or else it
dies: even if the 110th House were perfectly happy to let the 110th Sen-
ate enact a bill passed by the 109th House, the bill died at the end of the
109th Congress and must be passed again now by the 110th House. That
is, of course, the conventional view as usually stated. 3 1 But what one
might conclude from the discussion above is that constitutional prac-
tice-looking broadly at all modes of lawmaking-is not really typified
by formal rules of contemporaneous action, but instead displays toler-
ance for noncontemporaneous action accompanied by practical safe-
guards to ensure contemporaneous consent by all relevant actors. Under
that more flexible version of contemporaneity, there might not be a prob-
lem with a bill passed by the House during the 109th Congress and by
the Senate during the 110th, as long as agents of the 110th House are the
ones who take the enrolled bill to the President, thus indicating their
support.32 Or, to reach much the same result in a different way, it might
be permissible for each house to pass a bill during a different Congress if
and only if a house has a way to withdraw its assent from (i.e., "unpass")
a bill its predecessor house passed but which the other house has not yet
enacted. 33 (This would roughly mirror the states' ability to rescind sup-
port for a pending constitutional amendment.) Now, in choosing between
28 CRANDALL, supra note 27, at 100-01; THE ROLE OF THE SENATE, supra note 23, at
151-52.
29 Tillman, supra note 3, at 340 n.19.
30 THE ROLE OF THE SENATE, supra note 23, at 152.
31 See, e.g., CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 27-32 (1989).
32 As noted above, there are indeed historical practices surrounding the act of present-
ment that do tend to ensure continued consent by both houses. See supra notes 19-21 and
accompanying text.
33 There is a practice of one house requesting that the other return bills to it; the requests
are usually honored, but this is generally understood to reflect considerations of comity rather
than obligation. See Tillman, supra note 3, at 338. In Tillman's hypothetical scenario, the
Republican Senate would refuse to return the bill to the newly Democratic House. See id.
2007]
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these two versions of contemporaneity-that of formal action and that of
actual consent-it might be that contemporaneous formal action is pref-
erable for various reasons: it is a simpler and clearer rule, it better ac-
cords with congressional practice in the statutory context, etc. The point
is just that there is perhaps some degree of play in the constitutional
joints regarding formal contemporaneous passage as long as there is a
mechanism for ensuring continued consent.
Further, we must keep in mind that the real meaning of the Consti-
tution might not align with the judicially enforceable Constitution. The
"enrolled bill rule" generally prevents courts from looking behind a
signed enrolled bill to scrutinize the details of passage. 34 Even if the best
reading of the Constitution contemplates contemporaneous formal pas-
sage, a court would have a much easier time following the enrolled bill
rule if it knew that, although the 110th House had not passed the bill, at
least its Speaker had signed it or its agents had taken the bill to the Presi-
dent. In Tillman's scenario, of course, there is no such continuing con-
sent. The 110th House, with its Democratic majority, does not support
the bill but apparently cannot "undo" the vote in the Republican 109th
House because that earlier house sent a properly authenticated bill to the
Republican Senate, thus departing from the usual practice under which
neither chamber's presiding officer authenticates the bill until after both
chambers act. Such a scenario would present a tough and quite likely
fatal test for the enrolled bill rule. The courts are generally willing to
defer to Congress regarding the details of passage, but they may well
choose to intervene when there is manipulation within the Congress.
II. WHERE DOES THE REQUIREMENT COME FROM?
If there is a constitutional rule of contemporaneity (of some type,
either formal or more pragmatic), where does it reside?
Tillman's argument usefully reminds us that the Constitution says
precious little about the nuts and bolts of how laws are made. The key
text states:
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law,
be presented to the President of the United States; If he
approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with
his Objections to that House in which it shall have
originated .... If any Bill shall not be returned by the
34 See supra note 8. I say "generally" because it is not entirely clear that the signatures of
the presiding officers would be regarded as conclusive evidence of proper passage if the signa-
tures themselves revealed passage by two different Congresses. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. at
672 (noting that "nothing to the contrary [i.e., nothing impeaching proper passage] appear[ed]
upon [the bill's] face").
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President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it
shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a
Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the
Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in
which Case it shall not be a Law. 35
One finds in this text no mention of committees, no discussion of legisla-
tive calendars, not even an explicit statement that majority rule is the
governing principle. Much of the detail is therefore left to internal rules,
to tradition, and occasionally to statutes that regulate proceedings-all
sources that are in some cases longstanding and venerable but that are
also ultimately subject to the legislature's will. 36 What matters for pre-
sent purposes is that the constitutional text is at best coy in telling us the
permissible amount of temporal separation between passage in the two
houses. Where, if anywhere, is a contemporaneity requirement located?
If a textual basis is needed, we are not without options. 37 Professor
Akhil Amar gives the following explanation for why Article I, but not
Article V, requires contemporaneous action:
Partly because Article I is organized around bright-line
rules for contemporaneousness that have no Article V
counterpart. An ordinary statute must pass within a sin-
gle term of Congress, and a bright legal line separates
the last day of one term from the first day of the next,
regardless of how close together these two days lie on an
ordinary calendar. But no such bright lines punctuate the
Article V amendment process .... 38
This is initially puzzling, because in reading Article I, Section 7-the
most on-point provision-one finds a paucity of textually obvious rules
addressing timing, bright-line or not. The text describing how laws are
made does not indicate how soon after passage a bill must be presented,
nor does it specify that both chambers must pass a bill within any partic-
ular length of time. The lone provision in Section 7 setting a time limit is
the clause giving the President ten days to act on a bill after present-
35 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
36 See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Using Statutes To Set Legislative Rules: Entrenchment,
Separation of Powers, and the Rules of Proceedings Clause, 19 J.L. & POL. 345, 346 (2003).
37 There are a number of rather thin textual reeds that one could attempt to press into
service. The constitutional provision regarding presidential vetoes, for example, states that the
President shall return a vetoed bill "to that House in which it shall have originated." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 7 (emphasis added). One could read this as referring to the same term of the
particular house (e.g., "the House of the 109th Congress"), but the more natural reading would
be that the clause merely distinguishes between the House and Senate without carrying any
temporal connotation. We are at the moment seeking something more than a mere hook on
which to hang a principle derived from other sources.
38 AMAR, supra note 13, at 455 (emphasis added).
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ment. 39 That limit could well support an inference that no other time
limits exist.
Looking more broadly, however, other portions of Article I do
speak to timing and do arguably provide a rule of contemporaneity. Sec-
tions 2 and 3 provide that all Representatives and one-third of Senators
shall "be chosen every second Year."'40 Congress is in this way tempo-
rally segmented; each new two-year term brings a new message from
these agents' principals (not to mention some new agents). Every two
years there comes a new mandate from the principals, and one must seek
the agents' views anew. The two houses of the legislature, to pick up a
thread from earlier, are in this sense unlike people and unlike states.41
Thus, one could use the electoral cycle clauses to require some form of
bicameral contemporaneity. 42 And such a reading gains strength when
the above clauses are read in light of the Twentieth Amendment's prefer-
ence for rule by newly elected representatives rather than by repudiated
ones. 43 One could further enliven the text with higher-level structural or
normative arguments such as those sketched earlier. 44
But perhaps the contemporaneity requirement, like some other con-
stitutional rules, resides not so much in an explicit textual command as in
pre-constitutional usage, the framers' expectations, and implicit under-
standings. 45 Certainly there is a strong case to be made that contempora-
39 U.S. CONST. art I, § 7, cl. 2. To be sure, Amar refers to the "bright line" that separates
one term of Congress from the next. AMAR, supra note 13, at 455. That may be a bright line in
fact, but Article I, Section 7 does not by itself make that fact into a legal rule.
40 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; id. § 3, cl. 2.
41 The idea of legislative discontinuity admittedly seems to conflict with the notion that
the Senate is a "continuing body." Tillman's impish advisor and I both think that is a phrase
that cannot mean what it says. See Tillman, supra note 3, at 337 n.15. What it would mean for
a collective entity like the Senate to be the same entity over time is of course a question that
implicates deep philosophical questions. See generally DEREK PARFrr, REASONS AND PERSONS
199-306 (rev. ed. 1987) (discussing various factors that affect identity over time).
42 The clauses creating the electoral cycle have also been invoked as the basis for the rule
against irrepealable legislation (i.e., the anti-entrenchment rule), which is another rule that
"everyone knows" but that is hard to locate textually. See Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on
the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 379,
403-05 (1987); cf Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reap-
praisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665, 1673-83 (2002) (attacking various purported textual sources for
the rule).
43 Cf BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE CASE AGAINST LAMEDUCK IMPEACHMENT 10-32 (1999)
(arguing that democratic principles animating the Twentieth Amendment require that articles
of impeachment voted by a lame-duck House expire at the end of that Congress).
44 See supra text accompanying notes 4-10.
45 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) ("[T]he sovereign immunity of
the States neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment.");
Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) ("[W]e have understood the
Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition of our
constitutional structure which it confirms ...."); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24
(1979) (stating that the rule of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases is justified
"historically and without any explicit constitutional requirement"); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S.
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neity was thought too obvious to require explicit mention. It had been the
practice in Britain that bills died unless all steps-assent by Commons,
Lords, and Crown-occurred before the end of a Parliament.46 And if
contemporaneity was regarded as an obvious requirement, perhaps that is
why the first Congress adopted rules that assume it.47
Tillman recognizes that what he is discussing has not been done
before in our nation's history. Some might find this determinative, but he
gives it surprisingly little weight. In his view, the long practice of con-
temporaneity (or the non-practice of noncontemporaneity?) is beside the
point because historical practice resolves a constitutional ambiguity only
when "the asserted meaning was actually contested and the non-prevail-
ing institution acquiesced or otherwise adopted the practice."' 48 Tillman
is certainly correct that the mere absence of use of a constitutional proce-
dure does not eliminate the procedure: the states have never called a con-
stitutional convention as permitted by Article V, but the power still
endures. He is also correct that a paradigmatic case in which one can
bring in evidence of historical practice in order to settle a constitutional
dispute occurs when there is a clash between two contending branches
and one branch recedes in the face of the other. But surely the absence of
a controversy can be somewhat illuminating too. As Tillman's hypotheti-
cal story shows, noncontemporaneous lawmaking is the sort of thing that
mischievous legislators might find attractive under various electoral and
204, 225-32 (1821) (recognizing that the House of Representatives possesses an inherent
power, based on practical and historical considerations, to imprison a citizen for contempt
while the House remains in session, despite the lack of any express constitutional grant of
contempt authority); John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of
Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483, 504-05 (1995) (locat-
ing the anti-entrenchment rule in "traditional understanding[s] of the limits of legislative
power" and in constitutional structure). I do not give these examples in order to endorse the
particular constitutional propositions they represent but instead just to illustrate the familiarity
of the method.
46 Or at least that is how Americans likely would have understood British practice, based
on the presentation in leading authorities. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES
*177-82; MANUAL, supra note 17, § 516, at 270, § 588, at 306. Both Blackstone and Jefferson
indicate that pending bills died not only at the end of a Parliament but also when the monarch
closed different sessions of a single Parliament through prorogation. The fact that our system
lacks a royal prerogative of suspending legislative activity does not mean, in my view, that the
separate time-based limitation on the life of pending legislative business cannot be a back-
ground norm of our system. I note also that Tillman points to some departure from a rule of
contemporaneity, in the form of delayed executive assent, in this country before the advent of
the Constitution. Tillman, supra note 3, at 343-44. That differs from evidence of noncon-
temporaneity as regards bicameralism.
47 1 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 67 (July 27, 1789); 1 JOURNAL OF THE
SENATE 54 (Aug. 6, 1789). As Tillman recognizes, the rules assume that both chambers con-
temporaneously approve of the bill because authentication by the two chambers' respective
presiding officers occurs after both have passed it. Tillman, supra note 3, at notes 31-34 and
accompanying text.
48 Tillman, supra note 3, at 342.
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political circumstances, such that prudential calculations might make it
worth attempting. Why, then, has it never been tried? One reason might
be that the legislators, including the long-gone legislators who were
closer to ratification, always believed it was impermissible. For instance,
suppose there is an inkblot on my copy of the Constitution and I there-
fore cannot tell whether it allows a single Senator unilaterally to increase
his pay without the public knowing about it until after he is dead; the
relevant text is obscured. Suppose I know that this event-the sneaky
pay raise-has never happened, because many Senators have died and
such pay raises have not been revealed. Maybe all of our Senators
throughout history have been extremely virtuous people who never took
advantage of this power. Or maybe the Senators believed the Constitu-
tion did not give them that power. Constitutional interpretation is, to be
sure, not a matter of counting noses, but such consensus should lead us to
question whether we are correct in embracing a novel interpretation. Ab-
sence of evidence is sometimes evidence (which is not to say conclusive
evidence) of absence, notably when the evidence is expected.
CONCLUSION
Tillman has presented a thought-provoking argument that we are
very wrong about how laws can be made. I have done my best to defend
our conventional assumptions. I must admit that I am not as confident in
my arguments as one might like; it is easy to convince oneself of just-so
constitutional stories that justify our preconceptions, confusing the famil-
iar with the required. Thus, we should not dismiss the possibility that the
Constitution leaves some room for modes of passage that differ some-
what from those to which we are accustomed, even if we should con-
demn the specific scenario Tillman's impish hypothetical advisor
proposes.
